In this chapter I refl ect on the historical debates and theoretical issues related to the participation of communist and socialist parties in government. In this regard, it provides a history of the Left stance towards government participation in Europe, a subject of stormy debate since the late nineteenth century. In so doing, I draw not only on (Euro)communist parties' experience but South Europe socialists' as well. The impact of the dissolution of the USSR on the communist parties' strategy also is examined because it represents a milestone in their historical evolution. Finally, the chapter highlights the issues at the heart of these debates.
For communist parties, the question of strategy, or "the road to power," has been a matter of controversy since the days of Marx. More so than other political parties, the Left parties have historically struggled with the question of how to approach parliamentary democracy: to reject it per se as a capitalist farce that in reality represses the working class, or to try to change the system from within, fundamentally reshaping capitalist structures and democratic institutions (Olsen et al. 2010 : 11) . Communist parties, however, have differentiated between "being in power" and "being in government" and the more recent radical Left parties (RLPs) also seem to be aware of this distinction (e.g., see Iliada 2010 : 47).
The Left and Power: A Historical Retrospective
Certain questions have always been at the heart of such debates, including the following:
• Revolution or evolution?
• Peaceful, parliamentary road to socialism or violent revolutionary rupture with capitalism? • Transforming or crushing the bourgeois state? • Taking part in government or maintaining ideological purity?
• Does holding a governmental offi ce equal having power within the bourgeois state?
The (communist) Left has wavered on these choices/questions throughout the twentieth century and continues to vacillate. These discussions have put a lasting mark on the Left's legacy and still trouble it. The question that always arises is whether taking part in capitalist institutions (e.g., government) can eventually lead to socialism or whether this will unavoidably strengthen the capitalist status quo (Przeworski 1980 : 27-28) .
The establishment of the USSR following the Russian Revolution gave the world a concrete example of a socialist state. After several failed attempts to replicate its successful revolution, however, the Left recognized that an alternative strategy was necessary. The new strategy, named the "democratic road to socialism," would ensure its rise to power through elections. The fi rst formulations appeared as a variation of the early twentieth-century Marxist social democracy, and these developed into the "united front" strategy against fascism during the 1930s and 1940s. A third reformulation came about as a result of the Eurocommunism project of the 1970s and the fourth through the more recent (1990s and 2000s) pursuits of the modern European Left. Increasingly, however, the strategy of a slow, incremental, and peaceful passage to socialism has prevailed, especially in the post-WWII era.
The most basic argument in favour of this strategy is the perceived inability of the Leninist theory and old-fashioned communist parties to offer an effective socialist strategy for the West. The Leninist strategy has been perceived as one of assaulting and capturing power, a strategy most suited to countries plagued by conditions of poverty and backwardness (Mpelantis 2014 : 76-77 ). The Leninist model also has been seen to take a positive stance towards violence, to harbour an intrinsic hostility towards democracy, and to favour totalitarianism. This model now is thought to be inappropriate for the West with its long history of parliamentarism, and that it may lead to the social and political marginalization of the Left from vital social allies (e.g., the middle classes). The dissolution of the socialist bloc in 1989-1991 reinforced this argument. Moreover, ever since the dismantling of the USSR the Left has not been able to produce a persuasive, alternative social model.
Social and political scientists always examine the past to look for repeated patterns of political behaviour. In the context of this study, it is useful to examine the earlier stances and experiences of the communist Left parties towards government participation and compare these to their present positions and behaviours. On the other hand, we also can gain constructive insight by studying party families close to the communists, the social democrats, and the socialists, arguably much closer in the past than in the present. Throughout the twentieth century social democrats and socialists were always considered part of the wider Left bloc, and this is still true for some. Many scholars and the RLPs themselves, however, now differentiate between the Left and the social democrats and/or the socialists, regarding the latter two as centrist parties that have endorsed liberal values, although to different degrees (March 2011 ; Wahl 2010 ; Dunphy 2004 ).
SOUTH EUROPE SOCIALIST PARTIES AS A PARADIGM
The social democrats and the socialists represented two distinct party families for some time after the communists left the Second International in 1917. The social democrats tended to fl ourish in northern Europe, whereas the socialists converged in South Europe. The socialist parties were overideologized organizations with weak ties to trade unions and with strong Marxist tendencies; for these reasons they verbally pursued the complete abolishment of capitalism. Their principal objective was modernization and the development of welfare policies. In some instances (e.g., Spain and Greece) they played an important role in the consolidation of democracy (Sassoon 1997 : 4) .
The social democrats, on the other hand, were more pragmatic; they accommodated many more ideological tendencies and established very strong links to the trade unions. Their task was not the modernization of capitalism but its management and the proper distribution of wealth resulting from growth. Although both party families gradually accepted the basic norms and values of capitalism, this occurred at different times-the socialists much later than the social democrats (Sassoon 1997 : 3-6; Diamantopoulos 1991 : 69-95 ). This was not unrelated to the intense competition the former faced from resilient communist parties in South Europe (Smith 2015 ) .
The social democratic move towards more centrist politics and away from leftist positions was increasingly evident during the post-WWII years when they accepted a so-called social market economy (i.e., socially regulated capitalism). Here, socialism was reduced from a major claim for an alternative model of social organization to a moral demand for humanizing capitalism. The seminal work of Giddens ( 1998 ) , The Third Way , and its infl uence on Tony Blair's New Labour Party completed this transformation. Giddens led the way to the de-labourization of the Labour Party and its dissociation from what he called the "old Left" (i.e., the socialist Left); he argued in favour of rebuilding the party along more liberal and decentralized lines. Those lines were to include: the primacy of the market for fostering growth, the abandonment of the inclusive welfare state for a more selective one, the promotion of individual ethics, the support for globalization, the need for supranationalism, and an open party.
The socialists in South Europe presented a different case. By looking at their historical path, we can fi nd valuable insights into the way these parties dealt with issues similar to those that the RLPs were facing. The 1980s saw the socialist parties of the European south taking on the executive role, with some Eurocommunist parties either partaking in governing coalitions or supporting the socialist governments (see later in chapter). The socialist experiments in South Europe were not social democratic (i.e., accepting capitalism) from the outset. Nonetheless, they gradually became more pragmatic, and during their time in governments they began to make ideological adjustments, indicating the acceptance of a capitalist reality (Mpelantis 2014 : 127; Sassoon 1996 : 497-644; Diamantopoulos 1991 : 75) .
We can understand their development and direction by looking at the parties only in the context of society and politics of South Europe. In that area the social, economic, and political development differed dramatically from that in the north; this can partially explain the different trajectories of their political parties (Pinto and Teixeira 2002 ) . Although this hardly indicates backwardness, as argued by some theorists who regard peripheries beyond the European north as vying to catch up with the "developed" and "progressive" north (e.g., Mouzelis 1994 ), it does suggest a different path of development. Beginning in the 1930s the South Europe countries suffered under dictatorships and authoritative regimes; this led to an intense left-right polarization that radicalized the parties of the (plural) Left and caused their exclusion from the inner-party system (see Bosco 2001 , for a review of the concept). Marxism was the defi ning characteristic of the southern European socialists, and references to socialism were retained well into the 1980s, indicating that they did not mean to bring about a mere electoral change in government.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the socialists demanded not only social change but also civil modernization, democratization, and opening of the political system to outsiders (i.e., themselves) (Sassoon 1997 : 1-16 ). As such, the South Europe socialist parties promoted a peaceful road to socialism, which they still envisaged as a different society, much like the Eurocommunists. Their programmes resembled those of Allende's Popular Unity and the post-WWII Labour governments in Britain, which undertook extensive nationalization, although they were not the same.
South Europe socialist parties did not immediately raise the idea of changing the fundamental bases of capitalism, but they did question the existing balance between state and private initiative; they still professed socialism and introduced new political personnel into the political system. Despite their anti-capitalist, anti-EEC (European Economic Community), and anti-imperialist rhetoric, however, in practice they were not subversive parties. Instead, they focused on the following: small specifi c changes to democratize state functions and apparatus, which on some occasions led to extensive clientelism (e.g., Greece); a Keynesian economic strategy of increasing demand through more public spending and income redistribution, among other things; promoting social equality through larger pensions and better social welfare benefi ts; and restricting capital unaccountability. None of these parties withdrew its country from the EEC or NATO, and the more time the parties spent in governments, the less radical their policies became (Diamantopoulos 1991 : 69-95) .
As a result of the economic crisis during the late 1970s and early 1980s, all these parties radically modifi ed their policies, and in quite a similar fashion became full-fl edged social democratic parties (Sassoon 1996 : 112) . They all changed their emphasis from the primacy of social justice to the need for economic and social development. At their 1985 Congress, the French Socialist Party (PSF) was explicit in its decision to denounce Marxism, stating that: "in 1981 the main issue was how to break with capitalism.
[…] Today everyone talks about modernization" (cited in Sassoon 1996 : 559). Greece's Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) regrouped in the mid-1980s and announced a signifi cant change in its economic policy; while in 1979, when it came into power, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) decided to drop "Marxist maximalism."
In the context of this book's focus on the ideologically similar Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and Cypriot Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), it is interesting to examine PASOK, which has many ideological similarities to the two parties. Although PASOK rose to power preaching anti-imperialistic and anti-EEC slogans, it behaved quite differently once in government (Eleftheriou and Tassis 2013 ; Spourdalakis 1998 ) . Gradually, the party's anti-imperialist, anti-NATO, and anti-EEC positions and slogans were abandoned. In looking at the tactics that the PASOK leadership used to justify ideological modifi cations so that the party base would accept them, we note the following: the new rhetoric differentiated between short-and long-term targets (i.e., socialism), relegating long-term goals to an unforeseeable future before totally eliminating them; the party explained that unexpected environmental changes necessitated a readjustment to the "contract" it had "signed" with the people, citing certain developments that required short-term compromise. Silently, without ever stating it, the party abandoned its earlier policies geared towards socialism, nationalizations, and so on until they were totally forgotten (Diamantopoulos 1991 : 69-85; Spourdalakis 1988 ) .
Following the dissolution of the socialist bloc, which meant that the party was operating in a more secure political and party environment, at least in terms of opposition from the Left, PASOK gradually mapped out a course of identifi cation with the state (Vernardakis 2011 : 13) . The party that in the 1970s and 1980s had called for change, in the 1990s became a cartel party (see Katz and Mair 1995 , for discussion of this concept). The government was then independent of not only the party but also the parliamentary team, while party organization was totally ignored so that government policies were in no way jeopardized.
The overall scheme charted by South Europe socialist parties-of which PASOK is a very good example-revealed a gradual but linear movement towards the centre. Initially, they radicalized in order to rise electorally, gaining from their more leftist competitors and against the ruling class that excluded them from government. Subsequently, the socialist parties moderated their goals so that they could be included in the inner-party system and be accepted as legitimate governing actors. This led them to emphasize the politics of symbolic competition. "Marxism never provided socialist parties of western Europe with any signifi cant practical counsel in government" (Sassoon 1997 : 3-4) .
Their "centrist" course continued until they eventually abandoned socialism and adopted social democracy at a time when the social democrats had agreed to social liberalism (see Giddens 1998 ) . Despite the varying degrees to which the parties adhered to social liberalism, they all accepted economic technocratic effi ciency over social justice; they considered the Keynesian contract as outdated; they accepted privatizations; and they agreed to the primacy of the markets. Gradually, they also were driven to cartelization.
The Legacy of Eurocommunism
However useful the socialist parties' experience might be, prior to 1990 almost all the RLPs that participated in coalition governments adhered to Eurocommunism, and many of these parties have been criticized for allegedly opening the way to their social democratization (Sodara 1984 ) . It therefore is valuable to review the history of the communist Left's dealings with power and government within the Eurocommunist paradigm.
Eurocommunism was not formulated in a vacuum; it was signifi cantly infl uenced by world events and developments. These included the following: the situation in Chile with the popular front that brought Allende to government and the subsequent military coup d'état that overturned him, the outcome of the May 1968 revolts in Europe that brought a number of new social movements and actors to the foreground, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the leftist turn of social democracy in South Europe as a result of the dictatorships in that part of the continent (i.e., Portugal, Spain, and Greece). At the same time, the post-WWII European social model (i.e., the welfare state) led to enormous improvements in working and living conditions for the majority of the people, which resulted in the de-politicization and deradicalization of the working class (Wahl 2010 : 88-89) . All these events and developments led a number of western communist parties to question USSR's supremacy and ideological orthodoxy and to seek alternative paradigms.
During the early 1970s and after the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the western communist movement systematized the "democratic road to power" theory within the paradigm of Eurocommunism-that is, a strategy for claiming power within capitalism. Among the fundamental premises of Eurocommunism were the following stipulations noted by Balabanidis ( 2015a ) and Dunphy ( 2004 : 24-26 ):
• A gradual weaning of the communist parties from Moscow, believing that the communist movement had long ago entered a phase of polycentrism.
• Each country would develop its own road to socialism.
• Socialism would be achieved through elections, not revolution, thus embracing liberal democratic institutions.
• Multipartyism was acceptable.
• Criticism of the lack of political freedoms in the USSR.
• Gradual acceptance of the European integration project, albeit in a different direction and context. • Acceptance of government responsibility.
This was essentially a vision for socialism that claimed to offer a "Third Way" between Stalinism and social democracy. Central to the Eurocommunist parties' theorization was the relationship between the reform communists and the new social movements (e.g., ecology, feminism, anti-nuclear, pacifi st, etc.). Accordingly, the new historic bloc 1 would involve the union of working class with these new movements.
The seminal work about this tendency was done by Santiago Carillo ( 1977 ) , Eurocommunism and the State, then the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Spain (PCE). Carillo was heavily infl uenced by Bernstein (1899 Bernstein ( , revised 1996 and Kautksy ( 1985 ) ; these authors argued in favour of a nonviolent path to socialism by means of social reforms and political democratization that would lead to a change towards socialism. Carillo took their ideas and further argued that western communist parties could not repeat Lenin's strategy of an armed revolution in the context of advanced Western democracies.
As part of this new strategy, the PCE accepted the restoration of a liberal democracy and constitutional monarchy following the decades-long reign of Franco, which many party members viewed as treason. Carillo's reforms and the social democratization of the party under his leadership provoked dissent among party ranks that eventually led to Carillo's removal from leadership and in 1985 his eventual expulsion (see Sassoon 1996 : 616-626 , for a discussion about the PCE).
The Italian version of Eurocommunism drew heavily on Gramsci's theory of hegemony (see Ingrao 1979 ; Grouppi 1977 ) . The most prominent representative was Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) at the time, and his seminal work, Historical Compromise ( 1977 ). Gramsci's work, although ambivalent on some aspects, clearly distinguished between political society and civil society. He argued that the state is part of the political society and is characterized by coercion and domination, whereas civil society's main feature is hegemony. Gramsci realized that in Western states bourgeois power spread in multiple lines throughout civil society (differentiating them from Russia), including alternative governing solutions, many parties representing various social interests, mechanisms of ideological hegemony (e.g., the Church), the press, the education system, and so forth.
Gramsci then reasoned that the working class would fi rst exercise hegemony in the civil society realm; this would lead, through elections, to the total seizure of the state. He also theorized the concept of the "war of positions," which refers to a gradual undermining of the bourgeois state, and the "war of movements," which promotes a more aggressive strategy towards power acquisition. The Eurocommunist ideology, espouses primarily the war of positions , which justifi es government participation as part of the Left's penetration into state institutions in order to question and then weaken mainstream ideologies and practices that cement the bourgeois domination. In this respect, even bourgeois institutions can be mobilized for novel social purposes because their outcomes and practices are dependent on and shaped by social and political confl ict (Bruff 2014 : 116) .
Based on this theorization, the PCI developed its "Historic Compromise" project during the 1970s (Sassoon 1996 : 572-593; Ingrao 1983 ) . Amid a very turbulent social and political period in Italy, sparked by an economic crisis and marked by strikes and increased social unrest, Berlinguer claimed that a greater social majority was needed in order to safeguard Italy's constitutional order. This majority would consist of the Communists, the Socialists, and the Christian Democrats. According to the PCI, this was the only road to power for the party because, despite its differentiation from Moscow, it was excluded permanently from the inner-party system. Therefore, the only way to acquire legitimacy and to be considered as a legitimate governing partner was to be accepted as such by the principal systemic party-the Christian Democrats.
Following the PCI's participation in government a peculiar, at the time, theory of communist modernization emerged that included the acceptance of austerity measures. The PCI argued that it would benefi t the working class if Italy exited the crisis before pursuing any other social target (i.e., socialism), because there would be more jobs and time to plan the country's economic activity. Accordingly, the PCI said it was imperative that a clash between capital and labour be avoided while the economic crisis persisted. The party's goal during that specifi c period was not socialism but was to save the national economy and this required sacrifi ces on behalf of the working class.
Greece's Eurocommunism was shaped decisively by the prominent Greek intellectual Nicos Poulantzas in his famous work, The State , Power , Socialism ( 1978 ) . He was infl uenced by the May 1968 worker/student revolts that resulted in the emergence of new social movements (Kriesi et al. 1995 ; Inglehart 1977 ) . Poulantzas argued for a more leftist direction than the respective Italian and Spanish (and the French) communist parties and called for a more movement-oriented strategy. Poulantzas believed that the masses would not accept revolutionary conditions for a long time, and he also was concerned about the (un)willingness of people to take mass action given the fact that they lived in conditions of passive representative democracy (Mpelantis 2014 : 90) .
Poulantzas argued that the Left should take these concerns into account and plan the gradual and departmental takeover of the state. However, he highlighted the signifi cance of questioning state mechanisms and their confi guration, and he looked closely at the party's relationship to grassroots movements, arguing that if these issues were ignored the Left ran the risk of identifying with classic social democracy. Poulantzas believed that the process of capturing power would also be a process of state transformation through popular struggles ( 1978 : 141). As Poulantzas envisioned things, the state would be a locus of struggle but not the only one (Brie 2010 : 30 ). Poulantzas's democratic road to socialism was based on successive small battles that would enable the communist parties to acquire better positions both within and outside state mechanisms. The Greek reformist communist party, the Communist Party of the Interior (KKE-Es ; forerunner of Synaspismos), espoused the ideas of Poulantzas; however, it was never in a position to claim government participation during the 1970s and 1980s. Being too small electorally and continuously introverted, it was unable to present any real threat to the KKE and the socialists (PASOK).
The ideological shift of the communist parties in South Europe in the pre-1990 period facilitated joint ventures with socialists and social democrats that attempted to come together on the basis of various joint governing projects: the "joint programme" in France (1974 France ( -1978 , the "historic compromise" in Italy (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) , and the "forces of change" in Greece (1981) (Sassoon 1996 : 534-644) . These programmes promoted the creation and/or enhancement of the welfare state, the democratization of the state, and the inclusion of Left forces in governing coalitions. The new era that dawned after the 1989 breakup of the Soviet bloc meant that communist or socialist ventures would be pursued in a very different social and political international setting.
THE FALL OF THE USSR
The collapse of the socialist bloc posed a serious identity crisis for communist parties worldwide (Bosco 2001 : 329) ; it not only deprived them of a concrete example to validate their socialist vision, but it also reinforced the general belief that capitalism and the forces of the free market were the only options. As early as 1992, Fukuyama ( 1992 ) pointed to the "end of history," suggesting that democratic capitalism was the fi nal stop in human development. His thesis was increasingly accepted by many social democratic and socialist parties, as well as by a signifi cant number of reform communist and former communist parties. There was a sense that even the most democratic Left project was somehow buried in the ruins of the Berlin wall.
At the same time neo-liberalism, which had begun to make waves during the early 1980s (Panitch 1986 ), now took centre stage, leading to the overturn of Keynesian economics throughout the advanced world and dominating politics. Deprived of any organized ideological counterweight, capitalism was liberated from all the constraints that had been placed on it: nationalization, progressive taxation, workers' rights, social security regulation, and so on. Globalization began to be promoted intensively as a means of opening up the markets, and all protectionist measures against the free fl ow of capital were abolished; meanwhile, the working class, once the central electoral pillar of communist parties, became extremely fragmented. These developments silenced any discussion among the communist and radical Left parties about government participation and the claiming of power. New issues, such as criticism of neo-liberalism and of globalization, the fi ght against imperialist wars, nationalism, and racism, were prioritized in their agendas.
The various communist parties reacted differently to the dissolution of the socialist regimes (see March 2008 : 5; March and Mudde 2005 : 27; Bell 1993 : 10-11) ; their responses were informed largely by domestic communist traditions. Those communist parties that dissociated early from Moscow's foreign policy and adopted a reformist, Eurocommunist identity (e.g., the Nordic parties) found it easier to adopt a postCommunist identity and to survive the USSR's collapse unscathed, albeit totally transformed. Nevertheless, several countries with a strong radical tradition continued to maintain a stable communist party into the 1990s and some (e.g., Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, France) even beyond then. All communist parties, however, felt the weight of their ideological baggage at this critical juncture, in one sense or another, and all experienced internal tensions (Bull and Heywood 1994 ) .
The parties that stood fi rm in their socialist principles suffered a huge decline in their membership and electoral infl uence to the degree that their very survival was under threat (Katz and Mair 1992 : 335) . Overall, since 1989, many western European RLPs appear to have become electorally weakened (Table 2 .1 ); however, in some countries (e.g., Portugal, Cyprus, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany) the RPLs strengthened their electoral presence during the period 2000-2015 compared to the previous decade (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) .
The majority of the communist parties underwent profound change. The way in which they changed also was infl uenced by their internal balance of power. Like the Green parties in the 1980s (see Kitschelt 1988 ) , communist (and radical Left) parties are divided into Realos and Fundis ; (March 2008 : 10) . The year 1989 represented a turning point for Eurocommunist parties; ever since that time these parties have shown an increasing reconciliation with liberal democracy, focusing on broadening its limits and making it even more democratic. As a result, almost overnight, the once powerful South Europe communist parties became democratic socialists or Left democrats. For example, the Italian PCI abandoned its communist past and was renamed the Democratic Party of the Left, aligning with the Socialist International. As the then party leader, A. Ochetto, explained: "the party had long been a party of democratic socialism but the name and its symbols prevented the wider public from voting for the party" (see Sassoon 1996 : 752) . Essentially, the PCI harmonized its practice with its theory, as did most reformist communist parties.
To remain relevant many of those then-transformed RLPs turned to government participation; since the early 1990s, parties to the left of social democracy have participated in governments in Finland, Norway, Iceland, France, Italy, Ireland, Cyprus, and most recently in Greece. Their successes and failures, including their own analyses of the experience, have been hotly debated not only inside the parties but also by other RLPs that are nearing government participation (e.g., see Daiber 2010 ) .
THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES AND THE DIVERGENT STRATEGIES
Probably the most important question plaguing the modern radical Left is whether a class-based Left is politically "allowed" to take part in a government coalition or whether it can even accept this role if it means subscribing to a Left government programme that promotes the classic social democratic paradigm. Would taking a road where they can effect some reforms and small changes be enough to promote the socialist target and democratize the state, or would such a path only lead to the Left parties being incorporated within the system they want to change (Miliband 1978 : 168-69) ? Some argue that this must not only be allowed but that it also must be pursued (Spourdalakis 2013 ; Brie 2010 ).
This strategy combines, at least theoretically, activist and social movement characteristics with left-wing governmentalism. The implicit assumption of this strategy is change from within. The argument is that the Left taking part in government coalitions, or even governing on their own within capitalism, is a necessary step in the process of transforming the state and society-governing in this way is the vehicle of change. As globalization and European integration advance, however, and in order to be successful, the parties must form broad societal and political alliances outside their countries (e.g., within the EU context), thus Europeanizing their demands (Daiber and Kulke 2010 : 7-8) .
The danger in this strategy is that the Left could become reduced to pursuing humanizing capitalism as the ultimate goal. This would make the governing Left responsible for integrating itself into a capitalist and liberal democratic model (Panayotakis 2010 : 21; Weber 1987 ; Althusser 1980 ) . When the RLPs assimilate with the state, they tend to prioritize citizens' everyday problems over any other goal, which eventually leads to de-radicalization. Radicalization typically results from extraparliamentary struggle, whereas elections constitute a mechanism of de-radicalization that necessitates moderation in order to win over undecided and centrist voters (Weber 1987 ) .
A crucial aspect in this conundrum is the role of the government vis-à-vis the governing party. Will the party submit to the needs of governing or will it continue to champion extraparliamentary social causes? Will it maintain its autonomous role or will it become a branch of the government? Clearly, if the party is involved in government, the party itself is a crucial variable. It is important for the party to have the ability to effectively and comprehensively analyze the situation and the surrounding environment, as well as to have a strategy to implement at least some degree of social change. This strategy should be a part of a larger plan for bringing about social transformation (Wahl 2010 : 90-92) . The latter, as evidence suggests, has not been well developed by the RLPs.
Communist parties in the past usually have resolved this issue by dividing the party programme in two: a minimum and a maximum program. Radical Left parties tend to mimic this tactic. A minimum program refers to immediate claims, mainly democratic and economic, whereas a maximum program refers to the party's strategic goals of socialism and achieving political power for the working class. Generally, strategic goals are treated as matters of ideology because the Left feels that present conditions are not right for pursuing their agenda. This strategy includes the danger of transforming the party into a permanent electoral machine. Another tactical approach related to governing is to offer critical support to centre-left governments, as this would allow room for movement and the chance to pursue primary positions and more radical proposals than the often watered-down compromises needed in government (Wahl 2010 : 94) .
An alternative strategy is the one proposed by Holloway ( 2006 ) : a decision to not partake in governing coalitions but to remain outside the bourgeois power system, choosing instead to create institutions and forms of social organizations free of capitalist domination as a model for the future society they envisage. This position derives partially from the Luxemburg ( 1900 ) thesis that capitalism cannot be changed but only abolished, which will be accomplished through revolution because the state, she says, is nothing more than the instrument of the economic ruling elite. In Holloway's view then, government participation not only weakens the Left but also essentially nullifi es it.
This strategy is similar to that of the Zapatistas in Mexico during the mid-1990s. The Zapatistas worked towards the progressive substitution of capitalism, utilizing various forms and schemes of collectives, social laboratories, and communes. The strategy has as its aim not to conquer power but to block it from penetrating the social spaces, then to deny it, and fi nally to arrest it completely. The danger inherent in this strategy is that creating many small oases within the capitalist desert means that in their isolation they very easily could be destroyed.
Once the RLPs join (coalition) governments further questions arise (Olsen et al. 2010 : 3, 5) : Do these parties perform as well in government as they do in opposition? Are RLPs ready to practice politics as the "art of the possible" and adjust their policies to the diffi cult business of governing, despite inevitable claims of ideological betrayal by some of their members? Or, on the contrary, do they promise much and deliver very little when they are given the opportunity to take part in national governments? Their challenge is to continue to articulate a distinct political vision and a set of clear policy principles; at the same time, they must be able to compromise these principles to the degree that they can actually implement their policies.
Their biggest challenge is to combine idealism with factual policy proposals. As Dunphy and Bale ( 2011 : 490) point out: "ideology still has an important role to play for the radical Left." Arguably, the RLPs' most prominent stake is to maintain their radical identity in the process of striving for and achieving offi ce. To address these questions generalities and incomplete theorizations are inadequate. Therefore, the next chapters offer a detailed analysis that delves deeply into the specifi c conditions of each party and country under study here, and their histories and traditions, and they look at the balance of power between political forces.
